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1Deported by Marriage
AMERICANS FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LOVE
AND COUNTRY
Beth Caldwell†
“I pray that soon the good men and women in our
Congress will ameliorate the plight of families like the
[petitioners] and give us humane laws that will not cause the
disintegration of such families.”1
INTRODUCTION
More people have been deported from the United States
in recent years than ever before—over five million people since
1997.2 In the past decade, U.S. immigration enforcement has
focused on apprehending people living in the interior of the
country, resulting in more deportations of people with long-
term ties to the United States. For example, one study found
that while only 3% of deportees in Tijuana had lived in the
United States for three years or more in 2004, this proportion
© Beth Caldwell, 2016. The author has not granted rights to reprint this
article under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please
contact the author directly for reprint permission.
† With many thanks to Dean Susan Prager and Southwestern Law School for
generously supporting this research, and to Erica White and Johana Lucas-Cruz for their
excellent research assistance on this project. I am tremendously grateful to Linda Kerber,
who provided detailed and insightful suggestions about structure, content, and style. I am
also indebted to Elizabeth Keyes, who provided extremely valuable comments and
recommendations. The participants in the Works-In-Progress session for this paper at the
2016 Immigration Law Teachers Workshop offered helpful, concrete suggestions. This
group included: Lauren Aronson, Bram Elias, Douglas Ford, Michael Fraga, Anju Gupta,
Mary Holper, Kari Hong, Anita Maddali, Elissa Steglich, and Veronica Thronson. And to
the Editorial Board at Brooklyn Law Review, whose thoughtful suggestions have
improved both the form and substance of this article, thank you for your tireless work.
1 Memije v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006,
1015 (9th Cir. 2005)).
2 Tanya Golash-Boza, The Parallels Between Mass Incarceration and Mass
Deportation: An Intersectional Analysis of State Repression, 22 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 484,
486 (2016).
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jumped to 38% by 2011.3 Many of those deported in recent
years have lived in the United States for long enough to
consider it home.4 18–28% of all people deported to Mexico in
2012 reported their home or residence was in the United States.5
As the government deports more people who have established
their lives in the United States—people who have gotten
married and had children here—growing numbers of citizens are
affected by the deportation of their spouses or parents.
As a result of the recent surge in deportations of people
with long-term ties to the United States, hundreds of thousands
of American citizens’ marriages have been fundamentally
undermined.6 Some stay in the United States without their life
partners; others leave the country to keep their families
together. Either way, they experience financial, psychological,
and emotional hardships.7 Those who choose to leave are
uprooted, losing proximity to family and friends, access to their
property, and professional opportunities they trained for in the
United States. They face cultural and language barriers once
they move abroad. Most importantly, they miss the intangible
things—the smells, the sounds, and the incomparable feeling of
home. Those who stay in their homes lose the companionship of
their spouses and, with international borders between them,
families are often pushed beyond their limits. Children may be
separated from their deported parents, a separation which can
3 Ietza Bojorquez et al., Common Mental Disorders at the Time of Deportation:
A Survey at the Mexico-United States Border, 17 J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH 1732,
1732 (2015).
4 Surveys of people deported to Mexico demonstrate the trend towards deporting
people who lived in the United States for longer periods of time. See, e.g., Bojorquez et al.,
supra note 3, at 1732.
5 LAURA VELASCO & MARIE LAURE COUBÉS, REPORTE SOBRE DIMENSIÓN,
CARACTERIZACIÓN Y ÁREAS DE ATENCIÓN A MEXICANOS DEPORTADOS DESDE ESTADOS
UNIDOS 5 (2013) (reporting 18% of deportees stated the United States was their country of
residence); JEREMY SLACK ET AL., IN THE SHADOW OF THE WALL: FAMILY SEPARATION,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY 11 (2013) (finding that 28% of deportees
surveyed reported their homes were in the United States).
6 In a 2009 report analyzing deportations between 1997 and 2007, Human
Rights Watch estimated that “at least one million spouses and children have faced
separation from their family members due to these deportations.” HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR
NONVIOLENTOFFENSES 3–4 (2009).
7 For an in-depth exploration of the challenges people suffer as a result of the
deportation of a spouse, including losing jobs, living apart from children, experiencing
depression and suicidal ideation, and the dissolution of marriages, see NATHANIEL
HOFFMAN&NICOLE SALGADO, AMOR&EXILE: TRUE STORIES OF LOVE ACROSS AMERICA’S
BORDERS (2013).
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result in serious emotional and mental health issues.8 Under
such stressful circumstances, marriages often crumble.9
The law currently requires a citizen whose spouse faces
deportation to choose between either preserving her right to
marriage (by moving out of the United States) or her right to
enjoy the “privileges and immunities” of citizenship (by staying
in the United States without her spouse) because courts have
held that deporting an American citizen’s spouse does not
violate the citizen’s rights.10 A spouse’s deportation does not
infringe upon a citizen’s right to marriage, the argument goes,
because she “remains free to live with her husband anywhere
in the world that both individuals are permitted to reside.”11
Alternatively, she could decide to stay in the United States
without her husband.12 Being forced to give up one
fundamental right to protect another would generally violate
the Constitution: the Supreme Court has found it “intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another.”13
Yet, due to a convergence of factors rooted in racial and
gender bias, courts have declined to recognize citizens’ rights to
challenge their spouses’ deportations under the Constitution.14
Denying constitutional protections to a citizen whose spouse is
being deported means that no one can challenge the removal as
a violation of the right to marriage because the person facing
8 See infra Section II.B.
9 I obtained the statements and information reflected in this paragraph from
first-hand interviews I conducted with women whose husbands have been deported to
Mexico. I interviewed people in various cities in the border region of Mexico and in
California between 2010 and 2016. Interview with wives of those deported to Mexico, in
Border Region of Mexico & California (2010–2016).
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental
Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties
in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 776–77
(1996) (concluding that courts “do not give any serious consideration to the U.S.
citizen’s fundamental right to marry and to marital privacy” in immigration law cases).
11 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (plurality opinion).
12 See, e.g., Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (concluding
that although “[t]he physical conditions of the marriage may change [if she stayed in
the United States without her husband] . . . the marriage continues”).
13 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); see also Mostofi v.
Naplitano, 841 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting claim that visa denial
violates spouse’s constitutional right to “freedom of personal choice in marriage and
family life because they have ‘done nothing more than say that the residence of one of
the marriage partners may not be in the United States’”).
14 For a more detailed discussion of cases that have declined to recognize a
citizen’s right to challenge a spouse’s deportation, see infra Section II.A. See also
Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1975); Silverman v. Rogers,
437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Swartz v. Rogers,
254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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deportation—a noncitizen—is not entitled to substantive due
process protections in immigration proceedings.15
Two recent Supreme Court decisions signal an opening
to reconsider the legal fiction that deporting a citizen’s spouse
does not implicate the citizen’s rights. In Obergefell v. Hodges,
the majority opinion extending the right to marriage to same-
sex couples emphasized the fundamental importance of
marriage.16 Obergefell’s recitation of the various reasons the
Constitution must protect the right to marriage highlights the
problems with under-protecting the marital rights of citizens
who marry foreigners. In Kerry v. Din, decided in the same
term as Obergefell, an American citizen argued that her right
to marriage implied the right to live with her husband in the
United States.17 There was no majority opinion in the case, but
the tie-breaking opinion in the plurality rested on the
assumption that the citizen’s marital rights were implicated by
the denial of her husband’s visa.18 Four dissenting Justices
clearly concluded that citizens should be able to challenge
decisions to exclude their spouses from the country.19
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court struck down
prohibitions against interracial marriages as unconstitutional in
Loving v. Virginia.20 Now, although de jure prohibitions against
interracial marriages are history, marriages between people of
different national origins continue to be undermined by the law.
15 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625,
1646 (1992) (discussing immigration law’s historic exclusion of noncitizens from
substantive due process protections in immigration related matters); see also DANIEL
KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 136
(2012) (“However, for many deportees, one of the cruelest aspects of their plight is the
complete disregard by the legal system of their family.”); Kelly, supra note 10, at 771
(arguing for a “constitutionally humane approach” that would “recognize[ ] that all
individuals, regardless of their ties to the United States, should be accorded rights”).
Citizens cannot be deported without a constitutional assessment of the validity of the
government’s actions. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding “that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation
against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship . . . . unless he voluntarily
relinquishes that citizenship”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–67
(1963) (holding a provision that stripped Americans of their citizenship “without
affording the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”
unconstitutional because forfeiture of citizenship amounts to a punishment); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (holding the divestment of citizenship of a soldier
who was court-martialed for desertion violated the Eighth Amendment).
16 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–96 (2015).
17 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 2139 (“But rather than deciding, as the plurality does, whether Din
has a protected liberty interest, my view is that, even assuming she does, the notice she
received regarding her husband’s visa denial satisfied due process.”).
19 Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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In many respects, the forced separation of spouses and families
under U.S. immigration law parallels the problems the Lovings
fought against in that landmark case.
This article incorporates the experiences of women whose
husbands have been deported to Mexico in order to challenge the
foundational assumptions underlying the prevailing rule that
spousal deportation does not implicate the rights of citizen spouses.
It argues that the Constitution should protect the marriages of
binational couples in the same way it protects all other marriages,
and that strict scrutiny should apply to deportations of the
husbands and wives of U.S. citizens.
The marginalization of women’s rights to citizenship in
spousal deportation cases is informed by a history of treating
women as second-class citizens. In this context, the lack of
protection afforded to women whose spouses face deportation is
inextricably linked to gender. This article focuses specifically
on the experiences of women whose husbands are deported
because this is the population most affected by this phenomenon.
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized the right to
marriage for same-sex couples, the effects of spousal deportation
on this population will likely become increasingly apparent. This
is an area that warrants future research but is beyond the scope
of this article.
Part I examines the gendered predecessors of excluding
binational couples’ marriages from constitutional protection,
tracing the history of undervaluing women’s citizenship status
under U.S. law. Part II discusses racial subordination in the
context of binational marriages, both historically and in the
present. Part III describes the general rule—outside of the
immigration context—that marriage, and the closely related
right to live with one’s spouse, are fundamental rights entitled
to the highest level of constitutional protection, as emphasized
recently in Obergefell v. Hodges. Building on these conclusions,
this article argues that the right to marriage should be broadly
construed to encompass the right to live in the United States with
one’s spouse, consistent with the dissent in Kerry v. Din. Part IV
criticizes the common misconception that the deportation of one’s
spouse does not implicate a citizen spouse’s fundamental right to
marriage. Part V describes the severe consequences of a spouse’s
deportation to highlight the misguided nature of courts’ analyses
of the issue. Part VI argues that the Constitution should protect
the rights of binational couples to live together in the United
States because the Supreme Court has characterized being
forced to choose between two constitutionally protected rights
6 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1
as “intolerable” in other circumstances. In light of Obergefell
and Din, the deportation of a citizen’s spouse should—at the
very least—be entitled to strict scrutiny review.21
I. HISTORICALUNDER-PROTECTION OFWOMEN’S
CITIZENSHIP
For nearly a hundred years—from the 1850s through the
1930s—American women who married foreign nationals lost their
citizenship.22 During that time period, men’s citizenship was not
at risk in the same way. The modern-day experiences of American
women married to noncitizens who are excluded or deported from
the United States is reminiscent of the expatriation of American
women who married foreign nationals in the past.23 By their
marriage to a man from another country, women lost access to
privileges otherwise guaranteed to all citizens. Although they
were actually stripped of their citizenship in the past, the de facto
deportation women experience today has remarkably similar
effects. Women’s citizenship was historically, and continues to be,
under-protected.
Limiting women’s access to the privileges associated with
citizenship is rooted in American history. Historian Nancy F.
Cott suggests that “there is something peculiar—more tenuous
or vulnerable—about women’s (or perhaps married women’s)
citizenship in the United States.”24 Women’s access to the rights
and privileges of citizenship has not been guarded as cautiously
as men’s, and this reality continues to influence current policy.25
21 Drawing from political philosopher Joseph Caren’s concept of “the right to
stay,” I believe that the husbands and wives of U.S. citizens form such a crucial part of
American families and society that they should be categorically exempt from deportation.
See JOSEPHH. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THERIGHT TO STAY (2010). In other words, one’s
marriage to a U.S. citizen imbues him or her with a right to stay in the country. If a
citizen’s husband or wife commits a transgression, society should respond with the same
sanctions it would for a citizen. Because of this broader perspective, I argue here that strict
scrutiny review of spousal deportations is a minimum requirement. See infra Part VI.
22 See generally LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES
(1998) (examining divestment of women’s citizenship under the Expatriation Act in the
context of the broader subordination of women’s rights in American history, focusing
specifically on women’s unique citizenship obligations); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and
Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830–1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1444
(1998) (discussing the historic evolution of the relationship between marriage and
women’s citizenship).
23 Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907), repealed
by Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
24 Cott, supra note 22, at 1441.
25 The most obvious example is the doctrine of coverture, wherein women
obtained rights only through their husbands. See generally TERESA ANNE MURPHY,
CITIZENSHIP AND THE ORIGINS OFWOMEN’SHISTORY IN THEUNITED STATES (2013) (tracing
the history of women’s citizenship in the United States and linking women’s struggles to
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The marginalization of women’s access to the rights of
citizenship was embodied in the doctrine of coverture, which
the United States imported from English common law. William
Blackstone summarized the doctrine as follows: “By marriage,
the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband.”26 Coverture “transferred a woman’s civic
identity to her husband at marriage.”27 Rather than owe
allegiance to the state, a married woman owed her loyalty to her
husband. Any wages married women earned belonged to their
husbands, they could not enter into contracts, and they could not
file lawsuits because any legal transgressions against them were
perceived as transgressions against their husbands.28 Further,
men gained control of their wives’ property through marriage
and were held responsible for crimes their wives committed
because married women’s civic identities were subsumed by
their husbands’ identities.29 The marginalization of women as
full citizens was so extreme that in a property dispute at the end
of the eighteenth century, an attorney argued that a woman “is
not a member; has no political relation to the state any more
than an alien.”30 Under coverture, married women had virtually
no rights apart from their husbands.
Through coverture, married women’s access to the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship was limited. The rights of
married women whose husbands were not American were even
more marginalized. In the mid-1800s, women who married men
from other countries and then moved out of the United States
often lost their citizenship.31 Many courts treated a married
woman’s citizenship as “suspended” if she married a citizen of a
different country and moved abroad.32 For example, President
Ulysses S. Grant’s daughter married a citizen of England in
1874 and lived with him in England for a period of time.33 She
lost her citizenship, which was later restored by Congress.34
obtain full citizenship and universal rights to challenging “a narrative of exclusion that
legitimated the differentiated citizenship considered suitable for women”).
26 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
27 KERBER, supra note 22, at 11–12.
28 See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN,
MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 18–19 (1998).
29 Id.
30 See KERBER, supra note 22, at 25.
31 See id. at 40–41.
32 Id. at 41.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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In contrast, American men who married foreign women
did not lose their citizenship.35 Rather, under an 1855 law,
their wives automatically became citizens without having to go
through the naturalization process, as long as they fell within a
racial category of people who were allowed to naturalize.36 At
the time, women understood that their citizenship was more
vulnerable than men’s. In the words of an expatriated citizen,
“[i]f for men it is even a patriotic deed to extend by marriage
the influence and partnership of their country in foreign lands,
why should it not be the same when it is an American girl who
marries a foreigner?”37
The Expatriation Act of 1907 codified the loss of a
woman’s citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner by expressly
providing that “any American woman who marries a foreigner
shall take the nationality of her husband.”38 As of 1907, women
no longer had to move out of the country to lose their citizenship.
For fifteen years after the passage of the Act the “legislative
command denationalized or denaturalized every woman who
married an alien.”39 The law provided that a woman could
“resume her American citizenship” if her marriage ended.40
Widespread concerns about increased migration from
southern and eastern Europe, which peaked in 1907, influenced
the passage of the Expatriation Act.41 Many Americans
perceived immigrants from these countries as “a fearsome threat
to the country’s cultural and economic well-being,” and women
who married them were thus “discardable.”42 According to
historian Candace Lewis Bredbenner, in “the nativist-tinged
rhetoric of ‘100 percent Americanism,’ a citizen woman’s
marriage to a foreigner became vulnerable to interpretation as a
brazenly un-American act.”43 The Expatriation Act was one of
the several laws passed to weed out citizens with potential
allegiances to foreign governments.44
35 Id. at 37.
36 Id. This requirement only applied to “any woman who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws,” thus excluding Asian women and others due to
race. Id. See infra Part II, for a discussion of the convergence of gender and race in this
area of the law.
37 BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 105 (quoting Letter of Linda E. Hardesty de
Reyes-Guerra to NWP Headquarters, May 1922).
38 Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907), repealed
by Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
39 BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 47.
40 Expatriation Act of 1907 ch. 2534, 34 Stat. at 1229.
41 BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 5–6.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id. at 5–6.
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Ethel Mackenzie challenged the law in 1915.45 She had
been active in the campaign for women’s voting rights in her
home state of California, but was unable to vote even after the
state granted the right in 1911 because she had lost her
citizenship when she married a foreigner.46 An activist with the
financial means to take her case to the Supreme Court,
Mackenzie could have regained her citizenship status because her
husband qualified to naturalize.47 Recognizing that this course of
action “would still [sic] avail nothing to other women,” she instead
challenged the law in the Supreme Court.48 Her lawyer argued
her American citizenship was “a right, privilege, and immunity
which could not be taken away from her except as a punishment
for crime or by her voluntary expatriation.”49 However, she lost.50
The Court found the power to divest citizenship to be within
Congress’s plenary power, finding her decision to marry a
foreigner tantamount to voluntarily relinquishing her citizenship
because she did so “with notice of the consequences.”51 It reasoned
that “[t]he marriage of an American woman with a
foreigner . . . may involve national complications.”52 Despite
critiques from legal scholars that the law was a blatant violation
of the Constitution,53 the Court conflated binational marriage
with national security issues.
Not surprisingly, women’s lives were impacted profoundly
when they were stripped of their citizenship. When the Nineteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1920, women who had lost their
citizenship could not exercise the long-awaited right to vote.
According to Bredbenner, “[i]n addition to being denied a voice at
the polls, women married to aliens could be excluded or expelled
from the United States, denied access to or fired from certain
occupations (including female-dominated professions such as
public school teaching), and exempted from many public-
assistance programs” as a result of losing their citizenship.54 For
example, Lillian Larch, who had been born and raised in the
United States, applied for public benefits to support her three
45 SeeMackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 299 (1915).
46 BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 65.
47 Id.
48 Id. (quoting Becomes Citizen for Wife’s Vote, 44 WOMEN’S J. & SUFFRAGE
NEWS 401, 401 (1913)).
49 Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 308.
50 Id. at 300 (equating a woman’s marrying a foreigner to voluntarily renouncing
her citizenship).
51 Id. at 311–12.
52 Id. at 312.
53 See, e.g., BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 6 (quoting C. A. Hereshoff Bartlett,
Woman’s Expatriation by Marriage, 33 L.MAG. & REV. 150, 164 (1908)).
54 Id. at 68.
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children.55 Since she had lost her citizenship status when she
married a foreign man, the government initiated deportation
proceedings against Larch and her three children on the ground
that she qualified as a “public charge.”56
The Expatriation Act was partially repealed in 1922
with the passage of the Cable Act, also referred to as the
Married Women’s Independent Nationality Act. The Cable Act
provided that a woman married to a foreigner would no longer
lose her citizenship as long as her husband was eligible to
become a citizen.57 As the next part will discuss, women married
to men who could not naturalize—usually due to their race—
continued to lose their citizenship for many years after the
passage of the 1922 Cable Act.58
II. RACE AND EXCLUSION
Immigration law in the United States has a long history
of racial exclusion. The Page Act of 1875, for example, was the
first federal immigration law to restrict migration to the
United States.59 It specifically prohibited the entry of people
deemed “undesirable,” which included convicts, Asian workers,
and those Asian women who were projected to engage in
prostitution once in the United States.60 Then, in 1882, all
people of Chinese heritage were restricted from entering the
United States by the Chinese Exclusion Act.61 Informed by
overt racism towards people of Chinese descent, the Act
formalized racial exclusions in U.S. immigration law. The
Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of the Act in 1889,
equating the migration of “vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon us” with an act of foreign aggression.62
In the early twentieth century, the Immigration and
Nationality Act allowed only “white” people or people of African
descent to naturalize.63 Other people classified as “non-white”
55 Id. at 1.
56 Id. at 1, 173.
57 Meg Hacker, When Saying “I Do” Meant Giving Up Your U.S. Citizenship,
GENEALOGYNOTES 56, 58 (2014), http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2014/
spring/citizenship.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK95-RW42].
58 See KERBER, supra note 22, at 42–43.
59 See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643 (2005).
60 Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974).
61 See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the
Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 27 UCLA L. REV. 405, 413 (2005) [hereinafter
Volpp, Divesting Citizenship].
62 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
63 See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (1996) (discussing the requirement that noncitizens be “white” in order to
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were categorically prohibited from naturalizing and, in many
cases, from coming to the United States.64 Statutory prohibitions
against Asian immigration expanded in the early twentieth
century, eventually barring people from the entire “Asiatic zone”
spanning from Afghanistan to the Pacific.65 The Supreme Court
specifically considered individual cases of people of Japanese
and Indian ancestry, holding that they could not naturalize
because they were not “Caucasian” or “white.”66
Among those who lost their citizenship due to marriage,
women who were prohibited from naturalizing due to their race
suffered more than their white counterparts. Because they
were not eligible to naturalize, they were blocked from
recovering their citizenship after it was divested. For example,
Ng Fung Sing, the daughter of Chinese parents, was born in
the United States in 1898, acquiring birthright citizenship.67
She moved to China with her parents as a child, where she
eventually married a Chinese citizen.68 Her husband died, and
Sing tried to return to the United States in 1925.69 She was
denied admission and was not allowed to recover her American
citizenship because she was of Chinese descent.70 If she had
been white, she would have been allowed to resume her
citizenship upon her husband’s death.71 However, because she
was, in the words of the court, of “yellow race,” she was
prohibited from returning to the country of her birth.72
Women who married foreigners deemed “non-white” (and
not of African descent) also suffered more than women who
married “white” foreigners. American women who married “non-
white” foreigners continued to lose their citizenship for over a
decade after the passage of the Cable Act since it only applied to
women whose husbands otherwise qualified to naturalize.
According to Professor Leti Volpp, the Cable Act of 1922 only
naturalize). For an in-depth discussion of racial exclusion in U.S. immigration law, see
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998).
64 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (1924).
65 Volpp, Divesting Citizenship, supra note 61, at 414.
66 See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (excluding an immigrant from
India from naturalizing because he was not “white”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922) (excluding an immigrant from Japan from naturalizing because he was not “white”).
67 Volpp, Divesting Citizenship, supra note 61, at 407 (citing Ex parte Ng
Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670, 670 (D.D.C. 1925)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (citing Ex parte Ng Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670, 670 (D.D.C. 1925)).
71 Id. at 407, 430; see In re Fitzroy, 4 F.2d 541, 542 (D. Mass. 1925) (holding that
upon “termination of the marriage and her continuation or resumption of domicile [in the
United States], her original citizenship revive[d]”).
72 Id. at 407–08.
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allowed “white or black women expatriated for marrying white
or black noncitizen men to be renaturalized.”73 Asian American
women were most affected by the Act because they were most
likely to marry Asian men, (particularly given that fifteen states
had laws prohibiting marriages between whites and Asians).74
But any women married to men prohibited from
naturalizing were excluded from the protections of the 1922 Cable
Act. White women married to men from China, India, and Mexico
all challenged the loss of their citizenship in the 1920s.75
Congressional representative Victor Houston estimated 80,000
women from Hawaii alone would be unable to recover their
citizenship after marrying foreign men due to the racial
exclusions of the 1922 Act.76 Through a series of amendments to
the Cable Act between 1930 and 1936, citizenship rights were
finally restored to all women.77
Race continues to play a central role in the creation and
enforcement of immigration law. Lines are no longer drawn
between “white” and “non-white” to specify who qualifies for
naturalization, but immigration law continues to have racially
disparate impacts. Whereas Asian immigrants were most
negatively impacted by immigration laws in the past, Latino
immigrants currently suffer most under U.S. immigration policies.
Over 90% of people deported from the United States are
Latino men.78 In Fiscal Year 2015, the top four countries receiving
deportees from the United States were Mexico, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras.79 These countries collectively received
221,610 out of 235,413 total people deported from the United
States, amounting to 94% of all deportees that year.80 In contrast,
the government rarely deports unauthorized immigrants from
Europe and Canada. While there are an estimated 600,000 such
people in the United States—comprising 17.75% of the estimated
total number of unauthorized immigrants in the country—only
73 Id. at 433.
74 See id. at 433–35.
75 Id. at 435–36, 438.
76 Id. at 441–42.
77 Cott, supra note 22, at 1469; Volpp, Divesting Citizenship, supra note
61, at 444–46.
78 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 103–06 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20
2014%20Yearbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JR8-U4KF]; Tanya Golash-Boza & Pierrette
Hondagneau-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men and the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered
Removal Program, 11 LATINO STUD. 271 (2012) (discussing the targeted deportation of
Latino men).
79 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 9 (2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Report/2016/fy2015removalStats.pdf [https://perma.cc/NUW7-PEGU].
80 Id.
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1.12% of all unauthorized immigrants apprehended by the
Department of Homeland Security in 2012 originated from
Europe or Canada.81
U.S. citizens who marry Latino noncitizens therefore
disproportionately experience the risk of constructive deportation.
The Pew Research Center found that approximately 26% of
Latino marriages are interracial, indicating that Latina citizens
of the United States are likely the group most affected by the
widespread deportation of Latino men.82
In a social and political context where projections about
Latino population growth are perceived by some as a threat to
American culture,83 myths surrounding Latina fertility poise
Latina women as a threat: their children will contribute to the
projected Latino majority. According to anthropologist Leo R.
Chavez, high fertility rates among Latinas have been discussed
in national magazines as “dangerous,” “pathological,” “abnormal,”
and even a threat to national security.84 Chavez reviewed
seventy-six individual issues of ten national magazines
published between 1965 and 1999 to examine how the
magazines discussed Latina fertility.85 He found many instances
where the theme of high fertility rates among Mexican women
was linked to Latino population growth even though Mexican
81 According to the Pew Hispanic Research Center, as of 2012, an estimated
600,000 unauthorized immigrants in the United States were born in Europe or Canada.
Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in
14: Decline in Those from Mexico Fuels Most State Decreases, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov.
18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-
7-states-fall-in-14/ [https://perma.cc/F6KV-UCRR]. The Department of Homeland Security
reports that 6,720 unauthorized immigrants from Europe and Canada were apprehended in
2012, out of a total of 671,327 apprehensions. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014
YEARBOOKOF IMMIGRATIONSTATISTICS, supra note 78, at 92 tbl.34.
82 WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF INTERMARRIAGE (2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/ [https://perma.cc/67
C8-KZGK].
83 Nativist sentiment has combined with racist stereotypes to create a culture
wherein Latinos are conceptualized as “immigrants” or “aliens.” See generally LEO R.
CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE NATION
(2008) (analyzing negative stereotypes about Latinos, with a particular emphasis on
immigrants, and exploring how these stereotypes influence public policy). Latino citizens
have not been fully embraced in mainstream understandings of citizenship, and
widespread fears of an impending Latino majority have ignited anti-Latino sentiment
across the country. See EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THOSE DAMNED IMMIGRANTS: AMERICA’S
HYSTERIA OVER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION 36–41 (2013). Politicians, academics, and
news outlets warn of a “Latino invasion.” Popular discourse within the United States has
essentially erased the history of the U.S. invasion and taking of Mexican land and has
paradoxically reframed the issue to characterize Mexicans—and Latinos more broadly—
as invaders who threaten to take over the United States. For examples of this rhetoric,
see PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION (1995); Samuel Huntington, The Special Case of
Mexican Immigration: Why Mexico Is a Problem, AM. ENTERPRISE, Dec. 2000, at 20–21.
84 Leo R. Chavez, A Glass Half Empty: Latina Reproduction and Public
Discourse, 63 HUMANORG. 173, 174 (2004).
85 Id. at 175.
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women in the United States do not have dramatically more
children than their Anglo counterparts.86
A 2004 article by Harvard professor Samuel P.
Huntington clearly expresses the popular perception of the link
between Latina fertility and the projected Latino majority.87
Huntington warns “the fertility rates of these immigrants” from
Mexico present “the single most immediate and most serious
challenge to America’s traditional identity.”88 Myths surrounding
Latina women’s fertility may contribute to the under-protection
of Latina citizens’ rights.
Although women no longer lose their citizenship upon
marrying foreign nationals, citizens whose spouses are deported
lose access to fundamental privileges of citizenship. As in the
past, the citizenship of women whose husbands are not U.S.
citizens is particularly vulnerable. As Linda Kerber notes in her
history of women’s citizenship status, “glimpses of a world in
which women’s citizenship was dependent of that of their
husbands can still be discerned.”89
III. THE RIGHT TO LIVE ATHOME AS AMARRIED COUPLE
The right to marriage is a fundamental right protected
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments such that any
government infringement on the right is subject to strict scrutiny
review.90 In the immigration context, however, deportation
challenges based on governmental interference with a citizen’s
right to marriage have been subject either to no scrutiny or, in the
cases more favorable to immigrants’ rights, to rational basis
review.91 Although the freedom to choose whom to marry is
86 Id. at 175–76, 178.
87 Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.–Apr.
2004, at 32.
88 Id.
89 See KERBER, supra note 22, at 46.
90 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“Over time and in
other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the
Due Process Clause.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)
(“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that marriage is “one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”).
91 Many cases have declined to apply any scrutiny to challenges to spousal
deportations or exclusions from the country because courts conclude the right to marriage
is not impacted by deportation or exclusion. See, e.g., Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523
F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1975); Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Others
apply a low-level of rational basis review. See, e.g., Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d
1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring the government to present “a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason” for denying a visa); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary
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recognized as a “basic civil right[ ] ,”92 citizens who choose to marry
noncitizens do not benefit from the same marital protections that
apply to unions between citizens.
This part discusses the long-standing recognition of the
importance of protecting the right to marriage outside of the
immigration context. The centrality of cohabitation to marriage
is discussed to support the argument that government actions
that interfere with a couple’s ability to live together—including
deportation—should be subject to constitutional limits. Building
on the seminal marriage rights cases of Loving v. Virginia and
Obergefell v. Hodges, this article argues that the Constitution
should protect marriages threatened by deportation. The dissent
in Kerry v. Din was correct to recognize the right to marriage as
encompassing the right to live in one’s country with one’s spouse.
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
marriage as early as 1888, in Maynard v. Hill, when it found
that marriage “creat[es] the most important relation in life.”93 In
1967, the Court concluded in Loving v. Virginia that “[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.”94 The choice of whom to marry is, according to the
Loving opinion, a “‘basic civil right[ ] of man,’ fundamental to our
very existence and survival.”95 Most recently, the Court reiterated
the importance of marriage, and its status as a fundamental
right, when it extended the right to marriage to same-sex couples
in Obergefell v. Hodges.96
Obergefell both reinforced and expanded the
constitutionally protected right to marriage. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Obergefell begins by emphasizing “the
transcendent importance of marriage,” stating that marriage
has historically “promised nobility and dignity to all persons.”97
The opinion notes that marriage “allows two people to find a life
that could not be found alone” and “is essential to our most
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 931, 934
(1995) (explaining that “[i]t is now routine for lower courts to state the test in rational
basis terms, with varying degrees of actual bite” in “substantive due process and equal
protection challenges in the deportation setting”).
92 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942)).
93 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
94 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
95 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
96 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
97 Id. at 2593–94.
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profound hopes and aspirations.”98 According to Obergefell,
marriage is “the foundation of government” that operates as an
essential “bond of society.”99
In explaining its decision to expand the right to marriage
to include same-sex couples, the Court reviewed “the basic
reasons why the right to marry has been long protected,” focusing
on four primary justifications for the government’s interest in
promoting marriage.100 First, the choice of whom to marry is
“inherent in the concept of individual autonomy” and is “among
the most intimate that an individual can make.”101 Further,
“[c]hoices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”102
Second, marriage is a unique, important bond that “offers the
hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that
while both still live there will be someone to care for the
other.”103 Third, marriage “safeguards children and families” by
“allow[ing] children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family’” and “afford[ing] the permanency and stability
important to children’s best interests.”104 Finally, marriage is
important as a “keystone of our social order.”105 It fulfills both
functional and spiritual needs. Functionally, marriage provides
“material benefits” available only to married couples, such as tax
benefits, hospital access, health insurance, and survivor’s
rights.106 Spiritually, marriage also has “transcendent purposes,”
including its great emotional importance in people’s lives.107
Obergefell reaffirms the longstanding rule that marriage deserves
constitutional protection because of its importance to individuals,
families, and society.
Because of its central importance, marriage is thus
protected by the highest standard of constitutional review.
Government actions that “significantly interfere[ ] with the
exercise” of the right to marry are subject to “‘critical examination’
of the state interests advanced in support of the classification”
that interfere with the right.108 For example, Zablocki v. Redhail
addressed a state law that required residents to “obtain[ ] court
order[s] granting permission to marry,” which would only be
98 Id. at 2594.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2599–601.
101 Id. at 2599.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2600.
104 Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)).
105 Id. at 2601.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 2602.
108 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
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issued to those who were in compliance with their child support
obligations, and to those whose children “are not likely . . . to
become public charges.”109 The Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of the statute because of
marriage’s “fundamental importance” to all individuals.110 The
Court reasoned, “[w]hen a statutory classification significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”111 Thus, in Zablocki, the Court found the statute to be
“substantially overinclusive” and therefore not sufficiently
narrowly tailored.112 Accordingly, the statute was deemed
unconstitutional.113 Government intrusions into marriages are
uniformly subject to strict scrutiny when the intrusion does not
involve immigration law.114
B. Marriage and Living Together
Living with one’s spouse is such a central aspect of
marriage that the right to marriage must also protect the right
of a married couple to live together. Marriage simply cannot
fulfill many of its “transcendent” or functional purposes when
spouses are prevented from living together. In Obergefell, the
Court discussed companionship and the “intimate association” of
spouses as important aspects of marriage.115 The benefits of
companionship are necessarily limited when people reside across
international borders from one another, and the ability to foster
intimate association with one another is similarly hampered.
Companionship and intimacy are such important aspects
of marriage that a law that infringes upon the right to live
together as a married couple should be understood to infringe
upon the marriage itself. The Supreme Court has recognized the
109 Id. at 375 (quoting WIS. STAT. §§ 245.10(1),(4),(5) (1973)).
110 Id. at 384.
111 Id. at 388.
112 See id. at 390.
113 Id. at 390–91 (“The statutory classification . . . thus cannot be justified by
the interests advanced in support of it.”).
114 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96–99 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny to
a prison regulation that required inmates to obtain permission from the prison
superintendent, based on compelling reasons, in order to get married); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme
Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,
497–98 (1994) (“Regardless of how far the courts have expanded this penumbra of rights,
its core philosophy has remained intact; the right of family association is a significant
interest in fundamental rights jurisprudence. Any state action that potentially affects
such rights should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.”).
115 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
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right to “establish a home and bring up children” as central to
marriage.116 This recognition is premised on the unstated
assumption that the married couple would live together in the
home they establish. One of the purposes of marriage is to protect
children by affording them “permanency and stability” in the
context of their families.117 Living together is essential to create
the stable home environment the Supreme Court has recognized
as a central feature of marriage. This purpose is fundamentally
undermined when a married couple is separated by deportation.
Although physical proximity is not a prerequisite to
marriage,118 living together is an important aspect of a union.
In fact, cohabitation is one of its defining characteristics. It is
generally expected that once two people are married, they will
live together.119 Upon the dissolution of a marriage, it is
similarly expected that the couple will no longer live together.120
The centrality of cohabitation to marriage is evident in the
doctrine of common law marriage, whereby couples who live
together can be recognized as married at least in part because of
their cohabitation.121 Conversely, marriages were historically
understood to end when it was “improper or impossible for the
parties to live together.”122
In the field of immigration law, cohabitation is a required
element of establishing a valid marriage. According to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 319, a spouse of
a citizen must have been “living in marital union with the
citizen spouse” for the three years before filing an application to
adjust status from lawful permanent resident to citizen.123 The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
116 SeeMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
117 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
118 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 96 (concluding that prisoners maintain their right to
marriage despite the fact that they cannot live with their spouses during their
incarceration).
119 During the Renaissance, “[a] traditional part of the wedding ceremony was
the nuptial parade through the streets to escort the bride from her father’s house to her
new home.” Renaissance Wedding Gifts, VICTORIA & ALBERT MUSEUM, http://www.vam.
ac.uk/content/articles/r/renaissance-wedding-gifts/ [https://perma.cc/AV3K-YL99]. Women
were given marriage chests to store linens and other household items they would take
with them to their husband’s home. Id. The modern incarnation is a wedding registry,
through which people often register for household items based on the tradition of
establishing a joint household following marriage.
120 Much litigation in divorce cases focuses on which spouse will get the home
they shared during the marriage. See, e.g., Melissa Tapply, Who Gets the House in a
California Divorce?, DIVORCENET, http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/divorce/marital-
property-division/who-gets-house-california-divorce.htm#b [https://perma.cc/59BS-3VD7].
121 See Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 151, 155–56 (2009) (reviewing the history of common law marriage).
122 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
123 Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1430 (2012).
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policy manual, which governs the conduct of immigration
adjudicators conducting these interviews, provides that “USCIS
considers an applicant to ‘live in marital union’ with his or her
citizen spouse if the applicant and the citizen actually reside
together.”124 If a couple cannot prove cohabitation, the application
will typically be denied.125
When noncitizens apply to become lawful permanent
residents based upon marriage to a citizen, they must attend an
interview with an immigration officer.126 Interview questions
frequently focus on establishing whether a marriage is “bona
fide,” as opposed to a “sham marriage” entered into solely for an
immigration benefit.127 According to USCIS’s Manual, “[y]ou will
often have to question both the petitioner and the beneficiary to
determine whether the marriage is bona fide.”128 According to
the manual, “[n]o cohabitation” is an “indication[ ] that a
marriage may have been contracted solely for immigration
benefits.”129 The Board of Immigration Appeals defines a “sham
marriage,” which renders an applicant ineligible for immigration
benefits through his or her spouse, as a marriage “the parties
entered into with no intent, or ‘good faith,’ to live together.”130
The requirements for petitioning for relief under the
Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA)131 reinforce the centrality
of living with one’s spouse to marriage. In addition to
establishing a good faith marriage to a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident, a victim of domestic violence petitioning
for immigration relief under VAWA must also establish that
she lived with her spouse at some point.132 Cohabitation is such
124 Policy Manual: Marriage and Marital Union for Naturalization vol. 12, pt.
G, ch. 2, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/
HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartG-Chapter2.html [https://perma.cc/G3J7-M769].
125 According to the USCIS policy manual, “[u]nder very limited circumstances
and where there is no indication of marital disunity, an applicant may be able to establish
that he or she is living in marital union . . . even though the applicant does not actually
reside with citizen spouse.” Id. These exceptions are limited to one spouse being in the
military or required to travel for work. Id. Incarceration does not qualify. Id.







131 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (2012).
132 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(dd), (B)(ii)(II)(dd) (2012); see generally
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS OF THE
VIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMEN ACT (VAWA) (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42477.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UB3T-4UBU] (describing VAWA’s extension of family-based
immigration benefits to foreign nationals who can demonstrate they suffered from
abuse by U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents).
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an important indication of the validity of the marriage that it is
codified as a requirement separate and apart from the
marriage being entered into in good faith.
To be sure, people who cannot physically reside together
may still cultivate meaningful marriages. For example, many
prisoners serving lengthy sentences maintain strong bonds with
their spouses despite the separation.133 The Supreme Court
recognized that the right to marriage persists during one’s
incarceration in Turner v. Safley, holding that prisoners maintain
the right to get married during their incarceration.134 Reasoning
that “the religious and personal aspects of the marriage
commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement,” the
Court found that despite physical incarceration of one spouse,
several key aspects of marriage persist.135 These aspects include
marriage as an “expression[ ] of emotional support and public
commitment.”136 From a functional perspective, “marital status
often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits” and
to “other, less tangible benefits.”137 Accordingly, in Turner, the
Court held that a prisoner maintains the right to enter into a
marriage despite his or her incarceration.
Yet the fact that prisoners’ marriages are recognized and
valued does not undermine the centrality of cohabitation to the
institution of marriage. Prisoners are subject to a wide range of
severe restrictions on their liberty. Recognizing that they
maintain a right to marriage despite these liberty restrictions
does not mean that marriage is unaffected by the distance
between spouses. Rather, some relationships survive a spouse’s
imprisonment despite the distance. While it is certainly true that
a couple may maintain some important aspects of marriage
although they are geographically separated, living with one’s
spouse remains a crucial aspect of marriage. Deportation policies
that undermine a couple’s ability to live with one another
undeniably interfere with fundamental aspects of marriage,
including companionship and intimacy.
133 See, e.g., BRIDGET KINSELLA, VISITING LIFE: WOMEN DOING TIME ON THE
OUTSIDE (2007) (describing her own relationship with a prisoner and telling the stories of
several other women married to men in prison); Deena Guzder, Bar-Crossed Lovers:
Making a Marriage Work When a Spouse Is Serving Life, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/14/spouses-of-the-longtermincarcerated.html
[https://perma.cc/U84E-6PC3] (describing the marriage of Eshawn and Jermaine Page).
134 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 95.
137 Id. at 96.
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C. The Right to Live at Home as a Married Couple
A married couple’s right to live together at home was
central to the seminal marriage rights case of Loving v.
Virginia.138 Loving v. Virginia specifically held that “restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” and
the Due Process Clause because the “racial classifications
embodied in these statutes” infringed upon the “fundamental
freedom” to marry and thus were “subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.”139 Although
less widely known, the Loving case was also about married
people’s choice to live together in their home state.
Mildred and Richard Loving, an interracial couple, got
married in the District of Columbia.140 When they returned to
their home in Virginia, where the state law prohibited interracial
marriages, they were prosecuted.141 Instead of serving jail time,
the Lovings were banished from Virginia and were prohibited
from living together in their home.142
The Lovings moved to Washington, D.C. where they were
allowed to live together as a married couple,143 but they missed
their families and wanted to return home to Virginia.144 Richard
Loving clearly articulated this concern in comments to his
lawyer, whom he asked to tell the Supreme Court Justices “that
I love my wife, and it is unfair that I can’t live with her in
Virginia.”145 In holding that the Virginia statute infringed upon
the Lovings’ right to marriage, the Court implied that the option
to live with one’s spouse in a different state did not cure the
state’s infringement on their right to marriage.
When the Supreme Court concluded that Virginia’s law
impermissibly interfered with the right to marriage on
substantive due process grounds, the Court did not engage in the
reasoning that is now common in deportation-based challenges
predicated on the right to marriage. The Court could have
reasoned that the Lovings’ right to marriage was not infringed
138 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
139 Id. at 12.
140 Id. at 2.
141 Id. at 2–3.
142 Id. at 3 (“[T]he trial judge suspended the sentence [of one year in jail] for a
period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to
Virginia together for 25 years.”).
143 Id. at 2–3.
144 See generally THE LOVING STORY (Augusta Films 2011) (a documentary
telling the story behind the Loving v. Virginia case).
145 See The Loving Story: Synopsis, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/
the-loving-story/synopsis.html [https://perma.cc/NUV2-SZJH].
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upon by the Virginia statute because they were free to live
together as a married couple in Washington, D.C. But in Loving,
the alternative of living somewhere else as a married couple
did not render the interference with their marriage null.
Rather, the Court vindicated their right to live as a married
couple in the state they chose.146
The Supreme Court has recognized living with one’s
family members as a fundamental right entitled to due process
protections in other contexts as well. InMoore v. East Cleveland,
the Court protected a grandmother’s right to share a home with
her grandsons.147 The Court applied strict scrutiny to a statute
that would have prohibited this living arrangement, explaining
that “when the government intrudes on the choices concerning
family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the
extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.”148
In reaching its conclusion, the Court found the due process
clause protects “freedom of personal choice in the matters of
marriage and family life.”149 Like in Loving, the Court did not
reason that the grandmother could preserve her right to live
with her grandsons by moving from her home to another location
where this living arrangement would be allowed. Rather, the
Court protected the grandmother’s right to live in her home with
her grandsons.
D. The Right to Live in the United States with One’s Spouse
In the same way that the Lovings’ right to marriage was
impermissibly infringed upon when they were forced to live
away from their home to preserve their marriage, the rights of
U.S. citizens who are forced to leave the country to live with
their spouses are similarly infringed upon by their spouses’
exclusion or deportation.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the right
to live at home with one’s spouse as a fundamental component of
the right to marriage, but more than half of the Justices on the
Supreme Court signaled their support for acknowledging a
citizen’s right to live in the United States with her husband in the
2015 case of Kerry v. Din.150 Although the case focused specifically
on the doctrine of consular non-reviewability, it has broader
146 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
147 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
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relevance to the question of whether an American citizen’s
right to marriage is implicated when a noncitizen spouse is either
prevented from entering, or is forcibly removed from, the United
States. Din, a U.S. citizen, argued that her right to marriage
implied the right to live with her husband in the United States,
and the denial of his visa interfered with that right such that the
government must provide a “facially legitimate and bona fide
reason” for its decision.151
Din’s claim challenged the longstanding rule that consular
decisions are not subject to judicial review. Although her claim
ultimately failed, only three Justices concluded unequivocally
that her rights were not implicated by her husband’s exclusion.152
The four dissenting Justices reached the opposite conclusion,
stating that Din, as a citizen, has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in “her freedom to live together with her husband
in the United States.”153 Justice Breyer’s dissent recognized that
“the institution of marriage . . . encompasses the right of spouses
to live together and raise a family” in the United States.154 The
two concurring members of the Court—Justices Kennedy and
Alito—concluded that they need not determine whether Din had a
right to bring the claim.155 They assumed her liberty interests
were implicated by the visa denial and concluded the information
the government supplied regarding the reason for the denial
was sufficient.156 While Justice Kennedy was careful to specify
that the case “should not be interpreted as deciding whether a
citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of
her alien spouse,”157 the concurrence’s assumption that the
American citizen’s marital rights were implicated by the denial
of her husband’s visa is significant.158
151 Id. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The “facially legitimate
and bona fide reason” standard emerged in the case of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
770 (1972), where a group of university professors challenged the exclusion of a speaker on
the theory that his exclusion violated the professors’ First Amendment rights.
152 Id. at 2131 (rejecting Din’s “claim[ ] that the Government denied her due
process of law when, without adequate explanation of the reason for the visa denial, it
deprived her of her constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse” and
concluding “[t]here is no such constitutional right”).
153 Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that procedural due process
protections apply to this right).
154 Id. at 2142.
155 Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating “[t]he Court need not
decide . . . whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her
alien spouse” because “the Government satisfied due process”).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 2139 (“But rather than deciding, as the plurality does, whether Din has
a protected liberty interest, my view is that, even assuming she does, the notice she
received regarding her husband’s visa denial satisfied due process.”).
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Outside of the immigration context, protecting people’s
liberty interest to decide whom to marry has animated the
Court’s decisions to protect the right to marriage.159 In Loving,
the Court explained, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations.”160 The Court echoed the importance of
choice in selecting one’s spouse in Obergefell: “Like choices
concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and
childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution,
decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that
an individual can make.”161 This freedom to choose whom one
marries is fundamentally limited, however, when the decision to
marry someone who is not a U.S. citizen results in the loss of a
citizen’s right to live in her country as a married person.
In 1995, Hiroshi Motomura considered whether
constitutional protections of family unity constrain the
government’s power over immigration laws that affect families,
concluding at the time that “courts are likely to rule that Moore
and similar precedents are trumped by the plenary power
doctrine, which generally precludes constitutional judicial review
in immigration cases.”162 Now, over twenty years after Professor
Motomura made this prediction, the climate may be changing.
The expansion of marital rights exemplified by Obergefell coupled
with the plurality’s willingness to either conclude or assume that
a citizen’s rights are implicated by her husband’s exclusion from
the country point towards the possibility of the Supreme Court
reconsidering the longtime exclusion of family unity cases from
constitutional constraints
Extending constitutional protections to cases where a
citizen’s spouse faces deportation would be a logical yet
159 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“More recent decisions have
established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”); see also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (“While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not
been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.’” (internal
citations omitted)); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 & n.26 (1977).
160 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
161 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
162 Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 517 (1995).
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groundbreaking change because previous cases have uniformly
held that a citizen’s constitutional rights are not implicated by
the deportation or exclusion of a spouse.163 The next part
discusses these cases.
IV. THE LEGAL FICTION THATDEPORTATIONDOESNOT
INTERFERE WITHMARRIAGE
Despite the active role the judiciary has taken in
protecting the sanctity of marriage, over the past half century,
courts have routinely rejected arguments that the deportation of
a U.S. citizen’s spouse violates the citizen’s right to marriage.164
Two primary lines of reasoning justify these decisions. First,
citizen spouses can preserve their right to live in the United
States and to enjoy the rights afforded to them by virtue of their
citizenship status by residing in the country without their
spouses. Second, they can preserve their right to marriage by
moving to another country to live with their deported spouses.
But they cannot simultaneously do both, so they are forced to
choose between their right to live in their homeland or their
right to marriage.
Rather than applying strict scrutiny to determine whether
the government has a sufficient justification for infringing on the
right to marriage—as the law requires outside of immigration
law—the government is not required to justify its intrusion into
marriages when a couple faces separation due to immigration-
related issues. Historically, noncitizens facing exclusion or
removal have very little legal recourse because the government’s
decisions over immigration matters have been deemed to fall
under Congress’s plenary power to regulate foreign affairs and
international relations.165 As such, courts are unlikely to
intervene in immigration matters, and noncitizens’ constitutional
163 See infra Section IV.A.
164 See infra Section IV.A. Many cases have focused on the rights of citizen
spouses in this context because noncitizens are not entitled to substantive due process rights
in immigration-related matters. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706–07
(1893) (holding that the right to deport people “is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country” and that constitutional limits do not
apply due to Congress’s plenary power over immigration matters). The Supreme Court
subsequently recognized that noncitizens are entitled to procedural due process rights in
deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)
(acknowledging that the plenary power “is subject to important constitutional limitations”);
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (applying basic procedural
protections to removal cases); Motomura, supra note 15, at 1646–48 (tracing the history of
this area of the law).
165 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 70–75 (2007) (tracing the history of the plenary power doctrine); Legomsky,
supra note 91, at 926.
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rights are routinely disregarded in the immigration context.166
Under the current state of the law, the substantive due process
rights of noncitizens are not entitled to protection in immigration-
related decisions.167 Thus, noncitizens cannot (successfully)
challenge deportation on the grounds that it interferes with the
fundamental right to marriage.
Despite the robust body of case law expounding the
importance of the right to marriage, courts continually refuse to
recognize that a citizen spouse’s right to marriage is implicated by
the deportation of her noncitizen husband. This part reviews two
lines of cases: one dealing with spousal deportation, and the
other focusing on the deportation of a citizen’s parent or child. It
presents the primary justifications courts have provided for
concluding that citizens’ rights are not implicated when their
spouses or parents face deportation or exclusion from the country.
A. Marriage Cases
Courts have consistently held that the deportation of a
citizen’s spouse does not interfere with the right to marriage and
that “no constitutional right of a citizen spouse is violated by
deportation of his or her alien spouse.”168 According to this
analysis, the government does not need to justify its intrusion into
the marriage, even under the lowest level of rational basis review,
because justification is only required when one’s fundamental
rights have been violated.169
In Silverman v. Rogers, for example, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that requiring the wife of an
American citizen to leave the country for two years does not
“destroy[ ] their marriage,” as the Plaintiff argued.170 Rather,
the court concluded that “say[ing] that the residence of one of
166 Discrimination based on gender and national origin are allowed in the
immigration context whereas they would be prohibited in other areas of the law. See, e.g.,
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977) (upholding different rules for establishing citizenship of children born out of
wedlock to American citizen fathers than for children born to American citizen mothers).
167 See Kelly, supra note 10, at 730–31 (distinguishing “aliens’ rights” cases where
noncitizens have been vested with substantive due process rights outside the immigration
realm from “plenary power” cases that deny them substantive due process protections in
matters involving immigration law).
168 Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1975).
169 See id. at 556–57 (concluding that when an American citizen challenged the
exclusion of her husband from the country, “no constitutional rights of American citizens
over which a federal court would have jurisdiction [were] ‘implicated’ here” and thus
declined to require the government to present a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason
for the denial of a visa).
170 Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 983 (1971).
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the marriage partners may not be in the United States” is a
legitimate exercise of Congress’s discretion that “does not
attack the validity of the marriage.”171
Similarly, in Swartz v. Rogers, the D.C. Court of Appeals
rejected the argument of a citizen wife that her right to enjoy her
marital status, including establishing a home and raising a
family, is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and would be infringed upon by her husband’s
deportation.172 The court found that deportation would not
interfere with her right to marriage because even though “[t]he
physical conditions of the marriage may change . . . the marriage
continues.”173 Thus, although her husband’s deportation would
force her to choose between “living abroad with her husband or
living in this country without him,” even as a citizen, she does not
have an explicit “right to live in this country.”174 Therefore, “the
wife has no constitutional right which is violated by the deportation
of her husband.”175 The Fifth Circuit has similarly concluded that
the deportation order of a father had “no legal effect” upon his
American citizen wife and children because “[i]t [did] not deprive
them of the right to continue to live in the United States, nor [did]
it deprive them of any constitutional rights.”176
B. Parent-Child Deportation Cases
Previous attempts to challenge the deportation of the
parent(s) or children of American citizens on constitutional
grounds have also failed.177 As with the marriage cases, courts
171 Id.
172 Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.; see also Mostofi v. Naplitano, 841 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D.D.C. 2012)
(rejecting claim that visa denial violates spouse’s constitutional “right to freedom of
personal choice in marriage and family life because they have ‘done nothing more than
say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States.’”
(quoting Silverman, 437 F.2d at 107)); Udugampola v. Jacobs, 795 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101
(D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that a visa applicant’s wife and daughter “cannot demonstrate
that the defendant’s denial of the visa implicated a constitutionally protected interest”
and thus, their claim was not entitled to judicial review); Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d
487, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A denial of an immediate relative visa does not infringe upon
their right to marry” because “[t]he Constitution does not recognize the right of a citizen
spouse to have his or her alien spouse remain in the country.” (quoting Almario v.
Attorney Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in original)).
176 Garcia v. Boldin, 691 F.2d 1172, 1183 (5th Cir. 1982).
177 SeeHintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957) (upholding the deportation
of parents of a two-and-a-half-year-old American citizen child); David B. Thronson,
Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1196
(2006) (“[T]he proposition that children’s valid immigration or citizenship status alone is
insufficient to overcome the removal of a parent from the United States is a firmly
established starting point for courts considering the situation of citizen children whose
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have typically rejected arguments that deportation implicates
the constitutional rights of children whose parents face
deportation. Similarly, in Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court
rejected a citizen’s claim that his constitutional rights were
violated by his son’s exclusion from citizenship.178
In Fiallo, the Supreme Court considered a father’s
challenge to a law conferring immigration status on the foreign-
born children of American citizens differently depending on
whether the citizen parent is the child’s mother or father.179 The
Court rejected the argument that a higher level of scrutiny than
rational basis should apply to immigration laws that “infringe[ ]
upon the due process rights of citizens and legal permanent
residents, or implicate[ ] ‘the fundamental constitutional interests
of United States citizens and permanent residents in a familial
relationship.’”180 It reasoned that decisions regarding the entry
and expulsion of “aliens” “have been recognized as matters solely
for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the
power of this Court to control.”181
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, vehemently
dissented, writing that the Court had held “that discrimination
among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must be
tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws.”182
Marshall went on to emphasize his disagreement with the idea
“that Congress has license to deny fundamental rights to
citizens according to the most disfavored criteria simply because
the Immigration and Nationality Act is involved.”183 He argued
the Court should have recognized that the father’s constitutional
rights had been violated by excluding the son, because “[t]his
case, unlike most immigration cases that come before the Court,
directly involve[d] the rights of citizens, not aliens.”184
However, Justice Marshall’s view that preventing a
citizen’s immediate family member from living in the United
States involves the citizen’s constitutional rights has not been
adopted in the forty years since Fiallo. According to a Fourth
Circuit opinion, “[t]he courts of appeals that have addressed this
parents face deportation.”); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders:
Immigration Law & the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345 (2009).
178 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 800 (1977).
179 Id. at 788–89.
180 Id. at 794–95 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 53–54).
181 Id. at 796 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596–97 (1952)).
182 Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 806.
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issue have uniformly held that deportation of the alien parents
does not violate any constitutional rights of the citizen children.”185
Just as the majority did in Fiallo, courts have uniformly
rejected claims that American children have the right to contest a
parent’s deportation as a constitutional violation. In Enciso-
Cardozo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, for example,
attorneys for an American citizen child argued the child “has a
right to be reared in the United States, [and] that the deportation
of his mother necessarily implies his de facto deportation.”186 They
unsuccessfully argued that his mother’s deportation would
amount to his constructive deportation.187 The Second Circuit
concluded that although there may be cases where due process
would require a child to intervene in a parent’s deportation case,
this was not one of those cases.188 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
considered whether “enforc[ing] the two year residence abroad
requirement [against noncitizen parents] would be in violation of
their United States citizen son’s constitutional rights.”189 The
court concluded that the son’s rights were not implicated because
“Congress has the power to determine the conditions under which
an alien may enter and remain in the United States, even though
the conditions may impose a certain amount of hardship upon an
alien’s wife or children.”190
In Acosta v. Gaffney, the Third Circuit considered the
fate of Lina Acosta, a twenty-two-month-old American citizen
whose parents were ordered deported to Colombia.191 Her
attorney argued that deporting her parents would violate Lina’s
constitutional rights “because as an infant she must remain with
her parents and go with them wherever they go.”192 The court
acknowledged, “[i]t is the fundamental right of an American
citizen to reside wherever he wishes, whether in the United
States or abroad, and to engage in the consequent travel.”193
However, the court concluded that Lina’s rights were not violated
because her parents could decide to leave her behind with foster
parents in the United States.194 Alternatively, she could decide to
return to the United States when “she grows older and reaches
years of discretion” such that moving with her parents to
185 Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1986).
186 Enciso-Cardozo v. INS, 504 F.2d 1252, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1254.
189 Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1965).
190 Id. at 131–32 (internal citations omitted).
191 Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157–58 (3d Cir. 1977).
192 Id. at 1157.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1158.
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Colombia “will merely postpone, but not bar, her residence in the
United States if she should ultimately choose to live here.”195
Although often not expressly stated, these cases seem to
minimize the extent to which a citizen’s life is affected by the
deportation of a parent. The Tenth Circuit, for example,
clearly framed parental deportation as having merely an
“incidental impact” on a child’s life.196 As Part V explores, the
consequences of a family member’s deportation contrast sharply
with this characterization.
C. “Facially Legitimate and Bona Fide Reason” Test
A handful of cases has recognized that courts should be
able to consider government infringements on citizens’
constitutionally protected rights even when those infringements
are caused by immigration laws. On the one hand, these cases
represent a departure from the plenary power doctrine and from
the prevailing rule that citizens’ rights are not implicated by the
deportation or exclusion of a spouse. On the other hand, these
cases do not protect marriage according to the same standards
that apply outside the immigration realm. Although the highest
standard of constitutional review—strict scrutiny—generally
applies to government interference with marriages, a lower
standard of review has been applied in the few cases where
courts have recognized that immigration policies interfere with a
citizen’s right to marriage.
The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in 1972
when it held in Kleindienst v. Mandel that the First Amendment
rights of a group of American scholars and students were
implicated when the government denied Mandel a visa.197 He
had planned to visit the United States to deliver speeches and
participate in academic events on college campuses.198 The Court
upheld the denial of Mandel’s visa because it applied a low
standard of review, invoking the long line of cases that has
deferred to Congress’s plenary power to govern immigration.199 It
required only that the government provide a “facially legitimate
and bona fide reason” for denying the visa.200
195 Id.
196 Cervantes v. INS, 510 F.2d 89, 91–92 (10th Cir. 1975).
197 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
198 See id. at 765 (“[W]e are loath to hold on this record that existence of other
alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on the part of the appellees
in this particular form of access.”).
199 Id. at 769–70.
200 Id.
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As the cases discussed in this section demonstrate, the
right to marriage has not been protected in the same way as
the citizens’ First Amendment rights were protected in Mandel,
where the Court at least subjected the government’s actions to
the “rough[ ] equivalent to the rational basis test.”201 In the
marriage cases, courts have consistently ruled that the citizen
spouse (or child) has no standing to challenge the family
member’s deportation on constitutional grounds. But the First
and Ninth Circuits have recognized that a citizen’s rights are
implicated by the exclusion of a spouse and are therefore subject
to the same level of review the Court employed in Mandel.202 In
2008, the Ninth Circuit conducted a limited review into the
reason for the denial of a visa by a consular official because the
decision implicated the citizen spouse’s “[f]reedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life,” which is protected
by the Due Process Clause.203 The First Circuit similarly applied
this low level of review to a visa denial that was challenged
“based upon constitutional rights and interests of United States
citizens,” requiring the government to provide a “facially
legitimate and bona fide reason” for the denial.204
While the recognition that the right to marriage is
implicated by a spouse’s deportation is a significant departure
from the decisions of other circuits, these courts applied only
rational basis review. Given the low burden the government bears
under rational basis review, it is no surprise that both courts
concluded that the consular officials had facially legitimate and
bona fide reasons for denying the visas in both of these cases.205
The decision to apply rational basis review rather than strict
scrutiny was animated by the same judicial deference to
Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration matters that
has influenced other courts to conclude that the right to marriage
is somehow unaffected by the forced removal of one’s partner
from the country.206
201 Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1839 n.31 (1993) (stating that the “facially legitimate and
bona fide reason” test the Supreme Court applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel “appears roughly
equivalent to the rational basis test”).
202 See Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).
203 Id.
204 See Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Thus, if the
Department of State’s determination that Adams was ineligible to receive a visa . . . was
based on a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason,’ we will be constrained to uphold
Adams’ exclusion.”).
205 Id.
206 In Noel v. Chapman, for example, the court declined to apply strict scrutiny
to analyze the constitutionality of the deportation, reasoning that
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Just as strict scrutiny review applies to government
infringements on marriages in all other realms, the same standard
should apply to government interventions into the marriages of
binational couples. While the First Amendment rights of citizens
addressed in Mandel are undeniably important, government
infringements on the right to marriage affect people’s lives in a
much deeper way. As the experiences of women whose husbands
have been deported illustrate, deportation is a government
intervention of the highest order; interferences with marriage
should thus be subject to the highest standard of review.
V. THE REALITIES OF SPOUSALDEPORTATION
The day-to-day life of a married couple changes
dramatically when the partners live across international borders.
Yet immigration law renders “[t]he compelling narratives of loss
and separation that accompany the enforcement of immigration
law . . . largely irrelevant,” particularly under changes to the law
in 1996 that stripped judges of the discretion to consider the
effects of deportation on family members in many cases.207
Although courts have historically framed deportation as causing
merely “incidental impacts” on the lives of the U.S. citizen family
members,208 this reasoning does not hold up when considered in
light of deportation’s real-world effects on families. This part
offers a closer examination of the lives of U.S. citizens whose
spouses have been excluded or deported, revealing that the
consequences of spousal deportation are far more profound than
courts have recognized them to be.
The number of people affected by deportation has
skyrocketed in recent years, making this issue more pressing.
Under President Obama’s leadership, the United States has
embarked on a massive deportation effort, forcibly removing more
people than under any other President in recent history—over 2.5
million and counting.209 In fact, in his eight years in office,
[i]n view of the plenary power vested in Congress to fix and in the executive
to enforce, the terms and conditions of entry and stay in the United States,
alienage cannot be a suspect classification in this context, nor is there an
interference with any fundamental rights to marry and to raise a family.
Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1028 (2d Cir. 1975).
207 David B. Thronson, Unhappy Families: The Failings of Immigration Law for
Families that Are Not All Alike, in THE NEW DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM 36 (Daniel
Kanstroom &M. Brinton Lykes eds., 2015).
208 See Cervantes v. INS, 510 F.2d 89, 91–92 (10th Cir. 1975) (framing a parent’s
deportation as having an “incidental impact” on a child’s life).
209 Tim Rogers, Obama Has Deported More Immigrants Than Any Other
President, FUSION (Jan. 7, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/252637/obama-has-deported-
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President Obama is projected to deport more people than were
deported in a 108-year period between 1892 and 2000.210 The
majority have been deported to Mexico—nearly 1.5 million
people in the five year period between 2009 and 2013 alone.211
Nearly a quarter of the people the United States deports are
parents of American citizen children,212 and still more are
married to Americans. In a 2007 report analyzing deportations
between 1997 and 2007, Human Rights Watch estimated that
“at least one million spouses and children have faced separation
from their family members due to these deportations.”213 The
Migration Policy Institute estimates that “half a million children
experienced the apprehension, detention, and deportation of at
least one parent in 2011 through 2013” alone.214
The experiences of this population warrant attention.
Drawing from social science research, as well as from
observations obtained through primary research I have conducted
with deportees and their families in Mexico, this part highlights
the harms caused by laws that fail to protect citizens whose
spouses face deportation.215 In doing research for a book about the
consequences of deportation, I have interviewed over one hundred
people who have been deported to Mexico from the United States
since 2009. Although Mexico is certainly not the only country to
which American citizens’ family members are deported, it is a
useful example because the United States deports more people to
Mexico than to any other country.216
A. Fractured Families
The experiences of couples separated by deportation are
characterized by trauma and hardship. Deportation frequently




211 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2013 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 111, 114 (2014).
212 Seth Freed Wessler, Nearly 205K Deportations of Parents of U.S. Citizens in
Just over Two Years, COLOR LINES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/
nearly-205k-deportations-parents-us-citizens-just-over-two-years [https://perma.cc/JF98-
SEP2].
213 HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, FORCED APART BY THENUMBERS 4 (2007).
214 RANDYCAPPS ET AL., IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENTACTIVITIES
FOR THEWELL-BEINGOFCHILDREN IN IMMIGRANTFAMILIES 9 (2015).
215 Although there are certainly cases where male citizens experience the
deportation of a spouse, and where same-sex couples are affected by the deportation of a
spouse, the vast majority of couples I have interviewed in Mexico consist of a deported
man and a citizen woman.
216 See U.S. DEP’T OFHOMELAND SEC., supra note 79, at 9.
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United States. Studies have consistently found that “[p]arental
deportation has large negative consequences for family economic
stability.”217 A study that investigated the implications of parental
deportation and detention in the aftermath of immigration raids
found that these “households experienced steep declines in income
and hardships such as housing instability and food insufficiency.”218
Specifically, three out of five households reported they sometimes
or frequently experienced difficulty paying for food in the months
after a parent’s detention and/or deportation.219 The families they
studied “had almost no income” nine months following the parent’s
detention and/or deportation.220 Another study found that of sixteen
mothers whose husbands had been detained or deported by
immigration authorities, all had difficulties paying their rent,
and many were forced to move.221
The economic consequences of deportation can also
undermine familial relationships. Joanna Dreby, who has studied
Mexican transnational families separated due to both voluntary
migration and deportation, found that fathers who leave Mexico
to come to the United States for work maintain ties to their
children in Mexico through “frequent phone calls, gifts, and
remittances.”222 However, deportees to Mexico cannot do the same
because they earn so little in Mexico that they cannot support
their children in the United States. Derby concludes, “[i]n the
absence of an economic tie to their children, fathers’ emotional
connection also falters.”223 In addition to losing income due to
deportation, families may incur legal expenses that further
weaken their financial stability. Paying immigration attorneys
to fight against deportation, or to seek permission to return, can
cost tens of thousands of dollars.
Losing one’s spouse to deportation also takes a deep
emotional toll. Rebekah Rodriguez-Lynn’s husband was
permanently barred from entering the United States because he
came to the country without permission on two separate
occasions.224 When she left her husband and son behind in Mexico
217 Jodi Berger Cardoso et al., Deporting Fathers: Involuntary Transnational
Families and Intent to Remigrate Among Salvadoran Deportees, 50 INT’LMIGRATION REV.
197, 205 (2016).
218 AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., THE URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN
IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT viii–ix (2010).
219 Id. at ix.
220 Id.
221 Joanna Dreby, The Burden of Deportation on Children in Mexican Immigrant
Families, 74 J.MARRIAGE&FAM. 829, 838 (2012).
222 Id. at 837.
223 Id.
224 Rebekah Rodriguez-Lynn, How America’s Immigration Laws Tore My
Family Apart for Good, WORLD POST (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
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to return to the United States to finish a master’s degree at
Harvard University, she explains, “I felt as though my limbs had
been torn from my body.”225
Women report relying on telephone calls and video chats
to communicate with their deported spouses.226 Several have
reported that their deported husbands were “virtually present”
via video chat to observe the birth of a child in the United
States. “That was painful,” said one woman.227
Long-distance relationships can be challenging under any
circumstance; however, when the distance is caused by
deportation, the uncertainty of whether the couple will ever be
able to live together in the United States adds additional stress.
When her husband was deported, an American citizen, who calls
herself “Ray’s wife,” described falling into a state of deep
depression in a blog post:
I wake-up and I no longer recognize my life. My husband is not next
to me in bed and my bed is in this home I do not want to live in. I
feel my life and my dreams slowly slipping away. I have to keep
myself busy to avoid feeling the pain, desperation, and grief that is
there. The reality is—”my family” and “my home” are gone and who
knows how many years will be lost before we can have that back if
we ever do get it back.228
When a partner is forcibly removed from the country, the partner
who is left behind experiences a profound loss. Many experience
symptoms of depression: loss of appetite, disrupted sleep patterns,
and frequent episodes of crying.
Children suffer psychologically as well. An emerging body
of social science research has found that children whose parents
are deported suffer from higher rates of depression, demonstrate
rebekah-rodriguezlynn/immigration-family-tore-apart_b_7129574.html [https://perma.c
c/K3AK-ZDCN].
225 Id. Deportation and the separation it brings about is often described by those
experiencing it as feeling like losing part of one’s body. See, e.g., A Guide to Belonging
Everywhere: 6 Years Down . . . , WORDPRESS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://happycosmopolite.
wordpress.com/2015/09/01/6-years-down/ [https://perma.cc/KVQ8-JF58] (“Our sentences
(because it does feel like some horrid punishment) will be up September 2019, and it’s
sort of incredible to think that I have made it this long with an amputation as severe and
heart breaking as being denied my family and a part of my home.”).
226 I make this observation based on interviews I conducted with deportees and
spouses of deportees in Mexico. As discussed in the Introduction to this article, I have
conducted research about deportation to Mexico for the past six years. Throughout this
part, I discuss conclusions from this research and augment these findings with quotations
from other sources. Unless otherwise specified, the conclusions presented in this part
derive from interviews I have conducted in Mexico.
227 Interview with Liliana H. (Aug. 4, 2016).
228 FamiliesRforever, Updates—Nov 4., RAYS DEPORTATION (Nov. 4, 2011, 7:56
AM), http://raysdeportation.blogspot.com/2011_11_01_archive.html [https://perma.cc/Y
67F-DBC6].
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more behavioral problems, and experience declines in their
academic performance. In one study, 36% of children whose
parents had been deported demonstrated three or more
psychological or behavioral symptoms, with greater severity linked
to a parent’s arrest in the home, “cases where the child’s primary
caregiver was deported,” and a parent’s absence for more than a
month.229 In another, two-thirds of children whose parents were
detained or deported via an immigration raid experienced changes
in their patterns of eating or sleeping, symptoms indicative of
mental health issues.230 Over half “cried more often and were more
afraid, and more than a third were more anxious, withdrawn,
clingy, angry, or aggressive.”231
The stresses that accompany long-term separation often
contribute to divorce. Many couples report trying to keep their
relationships alive across international borders yet ultimately
deciding to divorce.
B. De Facto Deportation
Rather than face long-term or, in some cases, permanent
separation, many citizens leave the United States to keep their
families together.232 Although it is unclear how many Americans
have moved abroad due to a spouse’s deportation, the 2010
Mexican Census found that over 500,000 U.S.-born children
were living with their parents in Mexico alone.233
Courts characterize the decision to move out of the country
as a choice, but it does not feel like one to those who experience it;
it feels like living in exile.234 Once in Mexico, American women
lose their proximity to friends and family, access to their
professional career paths, and, perhaps most profoundly, they
miss being “home.” Nicole Salgado describes herself as living in
exile because she and her husband “choose to honor our marriage
in making our home together here—not with an international
border between us.”235 When she moved to Mexico, she missed her
home. In her words, “I missed my friends, my mobility, even my
students. I would fantasize that I was back at the beach in San
229 Cardoso et al., supra note 217, at 205.
230 See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 218, at ix.
231 Id.
232 See, e.g., Andrea Yancey Reyes, Life on Mars . . . I Mean TJ: An Exiled
Family Trying to Find Their Place in the World, BLOGSPOT, http://lifeonmarsimeantj.blog
spot.com/p/about-andrea.html [https://perma.cc/VD6H-QYZ8].
233 JEFFREY PASSEL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., NETMIGRATION FROM MEXICO
FALLS TO ZERO—AND PERHAPS LESS 14 (2012).
234 See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 232.
235 HOFFMAN& SALGADO, supra note 7, at 74.
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Gregorio or Half Moon Bay, inhaling the fresh, salty air . . . . That
nostalgia burned brightly, like a candle amid my dark
frustrations with my new residence.”236
Some American women who have relocated to Mexico
indicate that their quality of life is dramatically lower in
Mexico than in the United States.237 Particularly in rural areas,
many homes lack running water. Others who reside in urban
areas face many of the same challenges deportees face. They
struggle to acclimate to a country where they may not speak
the language, and finding employment is a challenge when one’s
education, training and licensing are all from a foreign country.
Wages are dramatically lower in Mexico as well; people often
earn twelve hundred pesos a week, which amounts to less than
one hundred U.S. dollars.
Adapting to a new culture, particularly when the
decision to move is forced, triggers both physical and emotional
challenges. An American woman whose husband was deported
to Mexico describes her first night in Mexico: “I cried myself to
sleep that night thinking I had made the biggest mistake in the
world. I cried because I felt stupid, homesick, spoiled, lost,
sheltered, weak, and most of all scared shitless of what was to
come.”238 She and her husband lived in Juarez, a notoriously
violent city. Within two weeks, she saw a dead body and
wondered, “What will I see in the next [ten] years?”239
For years after leaving the United States to live with
her husband in Mexico, Nicole Salgado struggled to adapt to an
environment where she could not find employment that
utilized professional skills. She explains, “I was also feeling
professionally aimless . . . . But there weren’t any jobs in my
field, at least nothing at a reasonable salary. My first ‘job’ was
teaching English in a local community center a few hours a
week—for $1.50 (U.S.) per student.”240
Many couples settle in the border region so the American
spouse can cross the border to work in the United States. This
ensures higher wages for the family, and a much better quality
of life than would otherwise be possible from wages in Mexico.
236 Id. at 34.
237 The information contained in this paragraph was obtained by interviews
conducted with deportees and their family members in Mexico and California between
2011 and 2016.
238 Emily Bonderer Cruz, The Real Housewife of Ciudad Juarez: Moving to
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However, crossing the border presents a major challenge in
people’s lives. With waits of up to three hours on a regular basis,
people spend fifty to sixty hours per month waiting to cross the
border.241 One woman reported developing recurrent urinary
tract infections because she could not leave the car to empty her
bladder while waiting to cross the border.242
Children who grew up in the United States but moved to
Mexico due to a parent’s deportation face challenges with
adjusting. This, in turn, impacts their parents. The Migration
Policy Institute has concluded that “[t]he transition to life in
Mexico can be difficult for children born and raised in the United
States” due to cultural and language differences, barriers to
entering schools, and the lower standard of living in most of the
countries to which parents are deported.243 Children of deported
parents may struggle more with adapting to life in Mexico than
their counterparts whose parents voluntarily return. A
qualitative study of the experiences of twelve children who had
relocated from the United States to Mexico with their parents
found that seven of the twelve seemed “generally well adjusted to
living in Mexico” while “five presented indications that they did
not feel comfortable in Mexico.”244 Two of the twelve children in
this sample had moved to Mexico because of a parent’s
deportation, others returned due to family needs or economic
hardships. The researchers found that the children of deported
parents “did not seem well prepared for the next chapter in their
lives,” and reported feeling mad, unhappy, and wanting to cry.245
“I hate that my kids have to suffer because of this,” one
woman reports. “It’s not their fault their dad got deported.” She
wishes her children could finish school in the United States.
Adjusting to attending school in Mexico is challenging for children
who have been raised in the United States. The Binational
Program of Migrant Education estimates that 4,000 American
citizen children attended school in Tijuana in 2013.246 Nearly half
had recently transferred from U.S. schools. Many American
children who move to Mexico do not speak Spanish and, according
to López, Mexican schools do not have the resources to offer
241 See supra note 9.
242 See supra note 9.
243 URBAN INST. & MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES vi–
vii (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/implications-immigration-enforcement-
activities-well-being-children-immigrant-families [https://perma.cc/GCP4-TUM9].
244 Ali Borjian et al., Transnational Children in Mexico: Context of Migration
and Adaptation, 10 DIASPORA, INDIGENOUS&MINORITY EDUC. 1, 46 (2016).
245 Id. at 48.
246 Interview with Yara Ampara Lopez,, in Tijuana, Mexico (Apr. 2016).
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bilingual education or to teach Spanish as a second language. In
addition to facing language barriers, students who come from the
United States struggle to fit in. Differences in the educational
methods and systems are particularly challenging for children
who are accustomed to American schools.247
The hardships women and children endure as a result of
a spouse’s or parent’s deportation call into question the legitimacy
of the courts’ reasoning in cases dismissing spousal deportation
claims. While there may be cases where the government’s
interest in deporting an individual is compelling enough to
justify this kind of intrusion into a marriage, the conclusion that
a marriage is not interfered with when one spouse is required to
live outside the boundaries of the United States is logically
indefensible in light of the severe consequences of deportation.248
C. Inconsistent Protection of Family Unity
Immigration law prioritizes family unity in many
contexts, providing special paths to residence and citizenship for
the spouses, children, and immediate family members of citizens
and lawful permanent residents.249 Indeed, family unity is often
referred to as the “cornerstone of our immigration policy.”250 Yet
247 URBAN INST. & MIGRATION POLICY INST., supra note 243, at 12 (“Research
suggests that the transition to schooling in Mexico, for example, can be very difficult for
children who have attended US public schools, as they generally do not have the Spanish
language skills or familiarity with the Mexican school system necessary to succeed there.”).
248 If the courts applied strict scrutiny, the government would have to show
that deportation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest, and would
have to consider other less restrictive means of accomplishing its goal before resorting
to deportation. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal
racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”). It is difficult to imagine
a scenario whereby deportation would be “necessary” given the robust mechanisms of
social control available to government officials in their regulation of citizens. Spousal
deportation may pass muster if the government could demonstrate evidence that a
citizen’s spouse was an active terrorist with plans to attack the United States, and with
no pending criminal activity the government could prosecute to incapacitate him,
leaving deportation as the only alternative. However, I hesitate to offer this example
because national security exceptions have routinely been used to justify problematic
immigration laws and policies, casting a wide net over people who do not present any
threat to national security.
249 Family reunification is widely recognized as a key priority of immigration law.
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW &
POLICY 262 (5th ed. 2009) (“The 1952 Act established the first comprehensive set of family-
based preferences. Since then, one central value that the United States immigration laws
have long promoted, albeit to varying degrees, is family unity. Consequently, much of
immigration law has become federal family law.”).
250 Carol Wolchok, Family-Sponsored Immigration, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 201
(1990); see also Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA.
L. REV. 629, 630 (2014) (“Family relationships are central to modern immigration and
citizenship law. The vast majority of immigrants who acquire permanent residency each
year do so based on family ties.”).
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policies that separate families are also pervasive in
immigration law.251 Immigration scholar David B. Thronson
argues, “[f]or families that do not meet the exacting templates
of immigration law, the story is not of family unity but rather
of separation and hardship.”252
Laws that fail to protect the marital rights of binational
couples hearken back to a history of under-protecting the
marriages of people of color and prohibiting the marriages of
interracial couples.253 During slavery, for example, the legal
system allowed slaves’ marriages and families to be torn apart
with no protection.254 Although the system of slavery was
exponentially worse than the current immigration regime, people
of color’s rights to family unity continue to be systematically
undermined by current immigration policy.
Further, although binational marriages are not prohibited
by the law as were interracial marriages in the past, marriages
between citizens and noncitizens are disincentivized by the law.
In Loving Across Borders, Jennifer Chacón draws parallels
between historic anti-miscegenation laws and current deportation
laws that separate married people who have different citizenship
statuses. Chacón argues that “[w]hile the maintenance of ‘White
Supremacy’ may not be the overt purpose of contemporary
immigration and nationality laws,” as it was under anti-
miscegenation laws, “it is a possible effect” of current immigration
laws.255 Historian Nancy Cott posits that “[b]y creating incentives
for some kinds of marriages and disincentives for others . . . the
states and the nation have sculpted the body politic” through
immigration policies much like through prohibitions on marriages
between whites and people of color.256 The union of two people
from different national origins is disincentivized by the law when
one partner stands to lose the right to live in the United States
with her spouse with no legal recourse.
VI. PROTECTING THEMARRIAGES OF BINATIONAL COUPLES
The Supreme Court recognizes that “[f]reedom of personal
choice in the matters of marriage and family life is, of course, one
251 For example, family unity is undermined in cases where people are granted
relief from deportation due to the risk of torture. See Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose:
Torture, Family Reunification and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
897, 931–33 (2015).
252 Thronson, supra note 207, at 33.
253 See Chacón, supra note 177, at 349–55.
254 Id. at 375–76.
255 Id. at 378.
256 Cott, supra note 22, at 1443.
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of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.”257 The right
to live with one’s family members is a constitutionally protected
right,258 and family unity is widely recognized as a cornerstone of
American immigration law. Combined with the right of citizens
to live in their homeland, the fundamental right to marriage
should encompass the right to live with one’s spouse in the
United States.259
The plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din signals that the law
may be moving in this direction. It is time to follow Justice
Marshall’s call from the dissent in Fiallo v. Bell, that “[w]hen
Congress grants a fundamental right to all but an invidiously
selected class of citizens, and it is abundantly clear that such
discrimination would be intolerable in any context but
immigration, it is our duty to strike the legislation down.”260 The
rights of citizens married to foreign nationals who face
deportation should be protected by the Constitution in the same
way that other marriages are protected. The current schema is a
vestige of the past; it both under-values and under-protects
women’s citizenship.
A. An “Intolerable” Choice
Cases declining to recognize that deportation interferes
with the right to marriage often rest on the premise that a
marriage is not necessarily impeded by one spouse’s deportation
because the couple can live together outside of the United
States.261 Alternatively, courts posit that a citizen’s right to
remain in the United States is not infringed upon by a spouse’s
deportation because she is free to continue living in the United
States without her spouse. In order to preserve her right to
marriage—and to live with her family—she must give up her
right to live in the United States. Conversely, in order to
exercise her right to reside in her homeland, she must give up
257 Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)).
258 SeeMoore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
259 A citizen’s right to live in the United States and to enjoy “the privileges and
immunities” of citizenship is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922) (“To
deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty, as was pointed
out in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13. It may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such
deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment
affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law.”).
260 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 816 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
261 See supra Section IV.A.
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her right to live with her family. Either way, she is forced to give
up something of primary importance: her family or her home.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has declared
government actions unconstitutional when they force a citizen
to choose between two fundamental rights. In Simmons v.
United States, the Court found that the “choice” between
testifying in a Fourth Amendment hearing or preserving one’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination created “an
undeniable tension.”262 Accordingly, the Court found it
“intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another.”263
Similarly, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Supreme
Court held that a statute prohibiting members of the
Communist party from obtaining and using passports violated
the Constitution because it interfered with the right to travel
abroad, which is “guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.”264 In that case, the First Amendment
right of association collided with the right to travel. The Court
reasoned that “[t]he restrictive effect of the legislation cannot
be gainsaid by emphasizing, as the Government seems to do,
that a member of a registering organization could recapture his
freedom to travel by simply in good faith abandoning his
membership in the organization.”265
In Aptheker, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that a citizen’s constitutionally protected liberty interest could
be preserved by giving up another constitutionally protected
right. According to the Court, “[s]ince freedom of association is
itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, restrictions imposed
upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that
the right to travel could be fully exercised if the individual would
first yield up his membership in a given association.”266
Therefore, the Court applied strict scrutiny to analyze the
constitutionality of the regulation, concluding that although
Congress unarguably “has power to safeguard our Nation’s
security,”267 the regulation was too broad because it “swe[pt] too
widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in
the Fifth Amendment.”268
262 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
263 Id.
264 Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (citing Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958)).
265 Id. at 507.
266 Id. (footnote omitted).
267 Id. at 509.
268 Id. at 514.
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Citizens whose spouses are deported are similarly forced
to choose between two fundamental rights—the right to marriage,
and the right to live in the United States. This article has already
discussed the Supreme Court’s commitment to protecting people’s
right to marriage at length. A citizen’s right to live in the United
States and to enjoy “the privileges and immunities” of citizenship
is no less important, and is guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.269 For example, citizens may not be
forcibly removed or deported from the boundaries of the United
States.270 In 1922, the Supreme Court explained,
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of
liberty . . . . It may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all
that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such deprivation
without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth
Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law.271
Just as strict scrutiny applies to government actions that force
people to choose between constitutionally protected rights in
other contexts, the same standard should apply to efforts to
deport the spouses of citizens. Forcing citizens to choose between
their marriages and their homeland is just as “intolerable” as
forcing people to choose between the freedom to travel and the
freedom of association.
B. The Under-Protection of Binational Marriages
Women’s marriages to foreign nationals are less
protected than other marriages, and the forced choice between
the right to marriage and the right to live in their homeland is
similarly less protected than other scenarios in which citizens
have been forced to choose between fundamental rights. In other
contexts where the government either interferes with a
marriage or requires a citizen to choose between to fundamental
rights, courts apply strict scrutiny to assess the legitimacy of the
government’s conduct. Spousal deportation or exclusion cases—
269 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment “was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against
congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship . . . unless he voluntarily relinquishes
that citizenship”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 166–67 (1963) (holding a
provision that stripped Americans of their citizenship “without affording the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments” unconstitutional because
forfeiture of citizenship amounts to a punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03
(1958) (holding the divestment of citizenship of a soldier who was court-martialed for
desertion violated the Eighth Amendment).
270 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922).
271 Id.
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and cases where the parent of a citizen faces deportation—are
unique because strict scrutiny does not apply in these contexts.
Denying this level of protection to citizens in binational
marriages affects women’s lives in much the same way that
women who were divested of their citizenship were affected in
the past. When married women were stripped of their
citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner in the early twentieth
century, they often lost their property.272 Now, women whose
husbands are deported often lose their homes because they can
no longer afford to make mortgage payments when they lose
the economic stability that having two incomes provides, or
when they move to a country where wages are much lower.273
As in the past, women who are constructively deported
suffer emotionally because they feel ostracized from their own
homeland. In 1926, Congressional testimony on the problems of
divesting citizenship based on marriage highlighted the
emotional aspect of being rejected by one’s own country.274
Elizabeth Kite, a scholar at the Library of Congress, spoke of
the problems facing Mary Das, a citizen who lost her status due
to her marriage to a man from India.275 According to Kite, “[s]he
happens to live in a place where having lost her citizenship, it
does not affect the holding of property. But there are other
things that are very seriously menaced, particularly the
humiliation and the thought of not being wanted as an
American citizen.”276 These sentiments parallel those reported by
women affected by spousal deportation now. According to one
such woman, who now lives in Mexico with her husband, “[i]t
feels like I’m being punished . . . like my own country is telling
me that I’m not wanted because of who I chose to love.”277
Legal reforms are needed in order to move past this
history of marginalizing women’s access to full citizenship.
C. The Evolution of the Law
Two evolving trends in the law strengthen the case for
reconsidering previous decisions on spousal deportation. First,
as discussed in Part III, the definition of marriage and the
272 Volpp, Divesting Citizenship, supra note 61, at 427–28 & n.113.
273 This conclusion is derived from my research in Mexico.
274 Volpp, Divesting Citizenship, supra note 61, at 435–36.
275 Id. (quoting Immigration and Citizenship of American-Born Women Married
to Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 4057, H.R. 6238, and H.R. 9825 Before the H. Comm. on
Immigration & Naturalization, 69th Cong. 22–28 (1926) (statement of Elizabeth Kite,
Scholar, Library of Congress)).
276 Id. at 436.
277 Interview in Tijuana, Mexico (Aug. 6, 2015).
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rights that accompany it have expanded, as evident in the
majority opinion in Obergefell and the plurality in Din. Second,
the consequences of deportation have become more severe over
the past two decades; deportation is now virtually automatic
and permanent in many cases. The reality of one’s spouse being
deported now is thus different than in the past.
During the past twenty years, deportation has become
notably more pervasive, and its consequences more severe. Many
deported for criminal convictions are prohibited from returning to
the United States for the rest of their lives; their deportation is
permanent. In 1996, Congress stripped judges of the discretion to
consider the effects an individual’s deportation may have on his
family in many cases where the potential deportee has been
convicted of a crime; “[t]he new deportation laws deny
immigration judges the opportunity to take family integrity into
consideration.”278 Excluding any consideration of the effect of
deportation on citizen family members from the decision-making
process makes constitutional protections even more important.
The laws governing deportation and exclusion have long
been critiqued for their lack of proportionality.279 People are
permanently barred from the country if they have falsely claimed
to be a citizen even on one occasion.280 Others are banned for
life because they entered the country on two occasions without
permission, and were unlawfully present for at least one year.281
They may seek a waiver of their exclusion, but only after
residing outside the country for ten years.282 In recent years,
hundreds of thousands have been deported for the rest of their
lives due to criminal convictions, the majority of which are
nonviolent or occurred decades ago.283 Requiring that the
government’s decision to deport be narrowly tailored in cases
278 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1952 (2000).
279 See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651,
1655 (2009); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1688 (2009)
(“Immigration law is, perhaps, the only area of law that eschews proportionality. Neither
the gravity of the violation of immigration law nor the harm that results bears any
relationship to whether deportation is imposed as a consequence.”); Maureen Sweeney &
Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for Crimes, 31 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 11, 13 (2011).
280 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) (2012). There are only very
limited waivers available for false citizenship claims, so those deported have virtually no
hope of ever returning. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW
266 (2009).
281 Id. at 268.
282 Id.
283 GUILLERMO CANTOR ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OVERDRIVE: A COMPREHENSIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ICE’S CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 14–15 (2015).
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where noncitizens have a citizen spouse would imbue the
immigration system with a modicum of proportionality.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court recognized the
more “severe” impacts of deportation in recent years and thus
afforded a higher level of protection to criminal defendants who
may face deportation.284 According to the Padilla opinion:
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically
over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of
deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority
to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded
the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to
alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The “drastic measure”
of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number
of noncitizens convicted of crimes.285
Courts should expand protections for spousal deportation
cases because modern deportation practices render the
consequences more severe than in the past. More American
citizens are impacted by the deportation of a spouse than ever
before given the shift towards internal enforcement.286 Further,
many deportation orders are now permanent, and the
consequences people face as a result are more severe.287 Many of
the spousal deportation cases address situations in which citizens
faced far shorter periods of exclusion from the country than
modern deportation cases. For instance, several of the historical
cases challenged two-year waiting periods,288 whereas many
citizens’ husbands are now permanently barred from ever
returning to the United States.289
Growing evidence of the profound emotional, psychological,
and financial consequences of deportation and the widespread
destruction of families that follows justifies reconsidering previous
decisions that seem to rest on unstated assumptions that minimize
the harm deportation brings to family members of the deported.
Government interferences with marriages—even in the name of
immigration control or national security—should be subject to
284 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
285 Id. at 360 (internal citation omitted).
286 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
287 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
288 See Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1970); Mendez v.
Major, 340 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1965).
289 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), (h) (2012). Cancellation of removal is barred for
those who have aggravated felony convictions. Id. § 1229b(a). Legal permanent residents
who have been convicted of aggravated felonies are disqualified for discretionary waivers of
inadmissibility under § 1182(h).
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strict scrutiny to ensure that citizens only experience constructive
deportation or family separation when absolutely necessary.290
CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court struck down
prohibitions against interracial marriages as unconstitutional in
Loving v. Virginia.291 Nonetheless, deportation policy currently
threatens marriages between binational couples in much the
same way that anti-miscegenation laws threatened the
marriages of interracial couples in the past. In many respects,
the struggles facing spouses whose marriages are threatened by
deportation are reminiscent of the problems the Lovings faced.
When combined, the right to marriage, the right to live with
one’s family members, and the right of a citizen to live in her
homeland give rise to a citizen’s right to live in the United
States with her spouse.
When viewed together, the 2015 Supreme Court decisions
in Obergefell v. Hodges and Kerry v. Din support this argument
that deportations of citizens’ spouses should be subject to strict
scrutiny. Obergefell reiterated the central importance of marriage
in people’s lives and made clear that liberty requires the freedom
to choose one’s spouse regardless of sex or, presumably, national
origin.292 The current state of the law—where the Constitution
protects all marriages except those between citizens and
noncitizens facing exclusion or removal—discriminates against
binational marriages.
Rules that discriminate against citizens who marry
people of different national origins should be overruled, and the
Constitution should protect the marriages of binational couples
just as it protects all other marriages. Although the Supreme
Court has held that it allows “Congress [to] regularly make[ ]
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” due to
its plenary power,293 immigration laws that trigger the
deportation of a parent or spouse of an American citizen impact
the fundamental rights of the citizen family member. As Justice
Breyer articulated in his 2015 dissent in Kerry v. Din, “the
institution of marriage . . . encompasses the right of spouses to
290 See Kelly, supra note 10, at 779–80 (arguing the federal government should
be subject to strict scrutiny when it interferes with the unity of immigrant families).
291 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
292 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–96 (2015).
293 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 80 (1976)).
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live together and to raise a family” in the United States.294
Courts should formally recognize this right, and should thus
apply strict scrutiny to cases where the spouse of a U.S. citizen
faces deportation.
294 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2142 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
